March 1996

Dr. John B. Alexander

 From the ashes of the bipolar world emerges a phoenix composed of a complex set of security issues. Anticipated scenarios have surfaced in which national interests are threatened by a myriad of plots.

A much debated issue is the appropriateness of using U.S. forces, especially ground troops, in peacekeeping operations. Despite that debate, to accomplish such missions U.S. forces need new technology including non-lethal weapons.

These devices have broad applicability across the entire spectrum of conflict from strategic to low level engagements. They are especially germane whenever the potential adversary is mixed with civilians and target acquisition or identification of friend or foe are poor or difficult.

Civilian law enforcement agencies similarly are faced with stringent requirements to minimize the use of force.

New Threats Surface

A wide range of threats to the national security has surfaced in the 1990s-ones that do not lend themselves to application of force in the traditional sense. The current Defense Department terms describing such missions are "peace support operations" or generically, Operations other than war." Generally, these missions include humanitarian, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement operations.

When considering all the threats of the future, there are some serious ones that are very conventional in nature. The bad actors still on the world stage include Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Each possesses a large armored force and has some mass destruction capability.

Others may be less likely adversaries, but their futures are not as clear and precautions must be taken. These include China, and some countries of the former Soviet Union. To counter these potential threats, the United States is required to maintain a highly mobile, extremely lethal conventional force.

Now, new and different threats are coming to the fore. Even the most conservative analysts allow for the actions of independent terrorist organizations. Transnational organizations might include economic enterprises, political entities, or even drug cartels, to provide a few examples.

Cali Cartel

These organizations can be powerful and have the ability to threaten U.S. interests. The Call Drug Cartel is an example of the complexity of the problems they can present. First, its headquarters is located in Colombia. An attack on the cartel's headquarters could be seen as an attack against Colombia. The cartel has agricultural, processing, financial, and distribution functions scattered through many other nations.

The options in force application are limited to those mutually agreed upon by the United States and the resident nation. Included as part of this transnational organization are U.S. citizens comprising a significant portion of the distribution system and ultimately the consumers. The money available provides the cartel with resources that exceed those of some smaller nations, thus it can wield substantial power. The bottom line on force options is that tanks, missiles, bombs, and other traditional weapons cannot be used. Also, it is difficult to use conventional force when the adversary doesn't have a fixed address.

Those same analysts also discuss issues of regional stability made difficult by subdivisions along ethnic, religious, tribal, or other lines. The recent conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle-East, Africa, and other areas of the world exemplify the problems unleashed by the demise of the checks and balances afforded by bipolar homeostasis of the post-World War II era.

The U.S. experience with peace support operations, such as Provide Hope in Somalia, Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and now Joint Endeavor, the intervention in Bosnia, attests to the complexities encountered when intervening in unstable areas, even for the most well-intentioned reasons.

Reluctant Participants

Though two decades past, the military operations in Vietnam and surrounding areas of Southeast Asia loom heavily as a nagging reminder of the problems associated with involvement in unconventional or ill-defined missions. Based on that experience, many military and political leaders have been extremely reluctant to recommend or authorize the use of U.S. forces for peace support operations except under the most egregious circumstances.

Some of these decision makers have viewed peace support operations as distractions from the primary duties of the Defense Department. They fear the public consequences of casualties, both U.S. and collateral. There is concern about their ability to explain to the American people, why deployment of U.S. forces is necessary and justified.

These concerns notwithstanding, the reality is that the United States has engaged in a number of peace support operations. It is now engaged in peace support operations. And, like it or not, there is a high probability the United States will engage in many more peace support operations in the future.

One lesson is already clear, peace support operations are not a lesser included case of general or limited war. They will require new training, tactics, and equipment, according to officials.

Somalia offers a case in point. As Adm. David Jeremiah, USN, then vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, said as he was preparing for the initial incursion, "The last thing I want to do is to kill people we are trying to feed."

And yet, that is exactly what happened. Somali casualty figures, mostly civilians, range from 7,000-10,000 killed by U.N. forces during the time of U.S. intervention. This was a humanitarian operation, the first undertaken at the direction of President Bush to support "American values" and not to Protect American interests." Operations such as these clearly demonstrate an urgent and immediate need for the development and deployment of non-lethal weapons.

The consideration of requirements for non-lethal weapons goes beyond national boundaries. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), too, is increasingly interested in providing new options. Currently, one panel of the NATO defense research group is conducting a year-long study of these systems.

Meanwhile, the NATO advisory group on aerospace research and development, better known as AGARD, has completed one study recommending the development of non-lethal weapons for enforcement of no-fly zones. Now, another AGARD study group is exploring casualty reductions by several means, including non-lethal systems.

Several non-lethal systems have been developed. Sticky foam guns were developed at Sandia National Laboratory. Foster-Miller, working for the Advanced Projects Research Agency created deployable nets of several varieties. Other industries and government laboratories have made available low energy lasers, used to warn potential snipers of the consequences of their actions, and other counter-sensor optical munitions.

Pepper spray, and other anti-personnel irritants have long been issued to civilian law enforcement agencies, and are now in the hands of some troops. Acoustic systems should be available in the near future.

Still, much more needs to be done. There are severe limitations on most of the systems currently available. Generally, it is difficult to apply the system at any respectable distance, and there is very limited confidence the weapons will do the job required. A wider variety of systems, particularly ones that provide substantial standoff distance between the troops and potential threat, are required, say officials.

Information warfare should be considered a part of non-lethal defense. It is now clear that information warfare has emerged on its own and can be seen as an independent but complimentary form of conflict. The need for continued development of information warfare is essential.

There are several caveats that must go with the development of non-lethal weapons. First, they are not a panacea for peace support operations. It is not safe or bloodless war as some officials have erroneously suggested. Even if well developed, undesired fatalities will likely occur.

No Perfect Systems

It has already been demonstrated there are no perfect systems. Second, troops must always be supported by lethal force. By themselves, non-lethal systems are not a credible deterrent. Third, troops should never be placed at risk due to the belief that non-lethal weapons can be employed in a manner that prevents casualties or reprisals. The political consequences must be thought completely through before troops are deployed.

In an era of constrained budgets, questions are correctly raised about the cost effectiveness of the development of non-lethal versus lethal weapons. Some military leaders contend the best way to limit collateral casualties and damage is to improve precision weapons. While precision is undoubtedly beneficial, there are still limitations on employment that would not be true for non-lethal weapons.

In addition to peace support operations, non-lethal weapons offer advantages on the high end of conflict. A significant problem facing decision-makers is the issue of believability when action is threatened.

Potential adversaries are aware of the nation's aversion to casualties. Certainly Iraq's Saddam Hussein misread U.S. intentions. Non-lethal weapons that can attack the infrastructure of an adversary could be employed to send an unequivocal message that the United States has the capability, intent, and the will to employ force. Given U.S. technical superiority, such attacks should act as a deterrent. Failing that, they should degrade the threat capability to wage protracted war.

Strategic Implications

The strategic implications of non-lethal weapons raise additional issues. They generate new intelligence requirements before the onset of hostilities. Command, control, and communications are very important when operating at the edge of conflict. Finally, accurate combat damage assessment is both difficult yet required.

Non-lethal, or less-than-lethal weapons as they are called by law enforcement, will play an increasingly important role in combating domestic crime. The development of non-lethal weapons for law enforcement needs has applicability for military peace support operations. Many of the crowd control, or limited assailant situations are similar to those faced by police.

Similarly, control of inmates in penal institutions has direct relevance as well. All of these requirements are virtually identical to the situations faced military police, especially in rear-area operations. Civil-military cooperation has begun. More is needed.

While non-lethal weapons will remain controversial, they are also essential if military forces are to be prepared to respond to the full range of potential missions. Assistance is needed from industry.

Dr. John B. Alexander is the conference chairman of Non-lethal Defense II, a meeting that will be conducted March 6-7 in Tysons Corner, Virginia.

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